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Abstract
Introduction: The 2003 Bam, Iran earthquake resulted in high casualties and required
international and national assistance. This study explored local top and middle level
managers’ disaster relief experiences in the aftermath of the Bam earthquake.
Methods: Using qualitative interview methodology, top and middle level health managers
employed during the Bam earthquake were identiﬁed. Data were collected via in-depth
interviews with participants. Data were analysed using thematic analysis.
Results: Results showed that the managers interviewed experienced two main problems.
First, inadequacy of preparation of local health organisations, which was due to lack of
familiarity of the needs, unavailability of essential needs, and also increasing demands,
which were above the participants’ expectations. Second, inappropriateness of delivered
donations was perceived as a problem; for example, foods and sanitary materials were
either poor quality or expired by date recommended for use. Participants also found
international teams to be more well-equipped and organised.
Conclusions: During the disaster relief period of the response to the Bam earthquake,
local health organizations were ill prepared for the event. In addition, donations delivered
for relief were often poor quality or expired beyond a usable date.
Moosazadeh M, Zolala F, Sheikhzadeh K, Saﬁri S, Amiresmaili M. Response to the
Bam earthquake: a qualitative study on the experiences of the top and middle level
health managers in Kerman, Iran. Prehosp Disaster Med. 2014;29(4):388-391.
Introduction
Annually, over 5,000 earthquakes are recorded worldwide with 3,000 earthquakes felt by
human populations.1 Iran is ranked in the top 10 countries with the highest occurrence of
earthquakes. On December 26, 2003, a 6.8 magnitude struck Bam a historical town in
southeast Iran. Approximately 40,000 died and over 30,000 were injured. The historical
citadel of Bam, the largest adobe structure in the world, and over 25,000 buildings were
destroyed.2-4
Adequate, prompt, and appropriate emergency assistance are crucial to the well-being
of victims in the aftermath of an earthquake. However, prompt relief may not materialize
due to lack of experience and limited resources.3,5-8 Prehospital and hospital readiness
play an important role in the reduction of causalities. These include appropriate and
adequate equipment, personnel training, and effective management.9,10
The Bam earthquake presented complex conditions and challenges for national health
policy makers who had never experienced such an extensive earthquake.11 Local policy
makers’ experience could be helpful for other policy makers in developing countries, and
also for international aid agencies.5,6,9,10 A number of papers in Farsi (the main language
of Iran)5,12-14 and in English2-4,7,8,10 have discussed the problems that arose after the
Bam earthquake. However, they are based mainly on personal observation or interviews
with the general public and rarely have included interviews of local policy makers. This
study’s goal was to review the Bam earthquake experiences of local policy makers and
mangers in the health domain.
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Methods
This study was of phenomenological qualitative design. Purposive
and snowball sampling were used, and participants were recruited if
they were high level managers in the health domain during the Bam
earthquake. To access these, a list of eight key managers was
identiﬁed. In total, six participants from among those identiﬁed
were accessible. The study protocol was approved by the ethics
committee at Kerman University of Medical Sciences (k/92/402,
Kerman, Iran). The participants were informed of the objective of
the study and the recording of the interviews. Due to cultural issues,
a written consent form was not used.15 The participants consented
verbally to participation and to having their voices recorded. An
interview guide was developed based on literature review and was
subsequently amended based on the ﬁrst two interviews. Each
interview took slightly over one hour. In total, the six participants
were interviewed with saturation level reached. In order to keep
conﬁdentiality, the results were number coded. In addition, all
records were coded and participants were not referred to by name or
job title. Interviews were recorded and transcribed word for word.
During the interview, main points were noted by the researcher.
Data were analysed using thematic analysis. In order to enhance
reliability and validity of the study, two researchers attended each
interview, and both took their own notes and developed themes.
A third person listened to a recorded sample of interviewees and
developed themes. Afterwards, they all met to discuss the themes,
and inconsistencies between themes, to reach a consensus on the
extracted themes. Finally, three main themes were developed,
including adequacy of preparation, appropriateness of donation and
delivery service, and issues with external assistance teams.
Results
Adequacy of Preparation
Inadequate preparation for the disaster was perceived by most
interviewees. Unfamiliarity with needs after the earthquake,
unavailability of essential needs, and rising demands which were
far above the participant’s expectations were mentioned as due to
lack of preparation:
Respondent 2: We had limited amounts of Bicarbonate
[a type of medicine] in our stock, whereas there was high level
of demand for that at the beginning. This challenged us in the
initial hours before we could request that other cities send us
their supplies.
Respondent 1: At the beginning, there were no toilets, and people
used the surrounding area around the camps for this purpose,
which caused the environment around the camps to be pollutedy.
The menstrual cycles of many of the women in the ﬁeld, including
female aid personnel and the local female population, were altered,
and they had premature menstrual cycles. Sanitary towels were
required, however, this had not been anticipated, and none of the
aid parcels included this itemy. After day four, people also
required condoms, which were also not supplied.
Respondent 6: Notebooks and papers were needed to organize
our tasks, yet they were in scant supply during those days. This
was something we had not even considered.
Respondent 2: Well, we had a considerable number of opium
addicts, and they needed morphine, which overwhelmed our
pharmacy system.
Lack of guidelines and prior training were noted as other
problems with preparation. Listed below is a quote extracted from
interviews, which reﬂect these issues:
Respondent 3: There was a lot of emotion at that time, and we
worked hard. At the beginning, we forgot our personal needs
and could not even sleep at night. I can say we worked through
the day and night. We all aimed to do something useful, but
you know we were not sure what was the best thing to do. We
were all in shock. Everybody worked based on their own per-
sonal experience and opinion, and in any case, we did not have
any experience [working in disaster conditions]. I think we
should have had some training.
Another problem was that there was no speciﬁc budget allocated
to disasters. The following quote reﬂects on this issue:
Respondent 4: At that time, we did not have any budget
allocated for disasters, and we were not sure how to cover the
expenses; this slowed down the process of assistance as we
needed to cover extra expenses related to disaster.
Appropriateness of Donation and Delivery Service
From the participant’s points of view, sometimes essential goods,
including food and sanitary materials, were either of a poor
quality or out of date. The shipping of extra and unnecessary
goods, such as nonessential medicine and food, which had
sometimes lost its quality as a result of shipping, were mentioned
as examples:
Respondent 4: Some medicine that was received from national
and international aid was out of date, and we had problems
destroying it. Also, some medicines were in languages other
than English, and we had problems with classifying and using
them.
Respondent 1: Some food had no expire date, and we did not
want to take the risk of food poisoning, so we disposed of
them.
Respondent 2: All provinces sent us serum, yet we did not need
it, and this even created problems with respect to unloading,
handling, and stockingy; also, I can remember, we received a
train loaded with bread from the city of A, and when it got to
us, all the bread was mouldy and useless. You can imagine how
difﬁcult it was to have to unload useless bread, and then think
how you can destroy it; this is hard, particularly when you have
many more important tasks to do.
Inappropriate distribution of the aid parcels, including food, was
noted as another problem:
Respondent 5: Distribution of essential goods was just awful;
food parcels were thrown down from the trucks at people.
The participants added that they required a rough estimation of
the population to enable a good service delivery and to be able to
help disaster-stricken people efﬁciently; however, due to mass-
population movement, this was neither easy nor possible:
Respondent 4: Population census and screening was extremely
necessary to be aware of real disaster-stricken people and to
provide them with appropriate health services and resources.
However, a large number of poor residents from other cities
rushed into Bam, and into the health services, to take advan-
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tages of the free and high quality care, and this overburdened
the health system.
External Assistance Teams
Most interviewees praised the way in which international teams
worked and were equipped. However, they criticized national teams
for inadequacy in equipment and lack of speciﬁc guidelines in
response to disasters. These points were raised by several participants;
the following are examples of quotes from part of their interviews:
Respondent 2: Often, many team members worked based on
their own evaluation and decisions, not based on speciﬁc lea-
dership. Our national team did not take essential equipment to
the ﬁeld, while international teams carried all necessary
equipment and acted based on speciﬁc and clear guidelines, and
they knew what they were supposed to do.
Respondent 4: National teams were not self-sufﬁcient, and
they demanded equipment from us, while international aid
teams were self-sufﬁcient and did not need our help for
equipment.
Respondent 3: We realized then, for example, that a spade is an
essential tool for removing debris and rescuing victims who were
buried under debris. You cannot come to aid and not have a
spade, but some national teams did not have such equipment.
Also, assistance teams were unfamiliar with the region and they
had their own authorities to follow; sometimes they did not follow
the local authorities, which caused chaos on different occasions:
Respondent 6: The members of the teams became confused
when they received different and inconsistent commands from
different levels of authority, and this slowed down the process
of response.
Respondent 2: National assistance teams interfered in each
other’s responsibilities, and sometimes this caused trouble for
themselves and for local authorities.
Interviews also revealed that the arrangement of the teams was
not suitable, and teams did not include required experts:
Respondent 5: We really needed an Iranian pharmacologist to
categorize medicine arriving via international aid, but there was
no such expert in the team.
Although it was pointed out that international aid teams were
very well prepared, the local teams argued that international
teams could have been even more efﬁcient if there was more
coordination, particularly at the beginning:
Respondent 3: At the beginning, with all that chaos we did not
think about the arrival of international aid workers and making
them familiar with regiony; however, it was ok in the next
few days.
Discussion
This study highlighted problems perceived by health managers
and authorities at the time of the Bam earthquake. While
they acknowledged that huge efforts had been made, problems
were reported in the process of assistance. Lack of adequate
resources, preparation, documented guidelines, efﬁcient coordi-
nation (speciﬁcally deﬁned responsibilities), and poor needs
assessment were all noted as weaknesses of response. All these
weaknesses can affect the efﬁciency and sufﬁciency of response,
particularly at the beginning, in the aftermath of a disaster. This
is because in emergency medicine, a well-prepared and prompt
response is crucial.16 Preparation is usually considered the
responsibility of national agencies.17,18 However, the level of
preparation is unsatisfactory in many countries; for example,
preparation and planning for disaster has been evaluated as weak
in Oceania, which leaves these countries dependent on external
aid in times of catastrophic events.19
Inconsistency in aid strategies and lack of cooperation and
coordination can result in losing time, and may cost lives in
disaster situations. Coordination of assistance teams is crucial in
the provision of an efﬁcient response. During the Bam
earthquake, there were approximately 40 international teams,
with around 1,600 staff, which posed a challenge to coordination
by the local authorities.11 In a study carried out in Turkey,
coordination also was noted as a major problem.20
For donations, unnecessary and unwanted goods were
identiﬁed as a problem. This problem included diverting
resources from real needs and occupying both personnel and
storage space with unnecessary items.21-24 In order to increase the
efﬁciency and usefulness of external aid and donations, the local
government should indicate to international organizations which
materials are required.25 However, lack of experience, shock due
to the size of the disaster, and problems in conducting rapid
surveys caused limitations for the local government.
Service delivery, such as food distribution after the Bam
earthquake, was unsatisfactory. There was poor supervision, late
provision of food, and unavailability of food storage equipment.26
This is consistent with previous reports suggesting that an
earthquake changed the pattern of availability, access, and
utilisation of food in Pakistan.26
Eraghizadeh and colleagues discussed a lack of predeﬁned
guideline for response and ill-deﬁned responsibilities during the
Bam earthquake led to confusion among assistance teams, and
ultimately, an ineffective response.5 It was argued that unclear role
deﬁnition and the existence of different commands from different
authorities at different levels were problematic.5 Furthermore, in
order to provide a prompt and effective response, a corresponding
responsible organization must have adequate resources. In
Pakistan, for example, the military is expected to respond in
disaster situations. The army response in Pakistan in relief and
rescue is evaluated as effective due to it being the only institution in
the country with adequate resources, including human resources,
appropriate transportation, and communication and unity in
commands and discipline.27 Lack of unity in command and low
levels of preparation can lead to a type of anarchy and be reﬂected
in different aspects of response with weak prioritization of aid, such
as late referral of patients with poor health conditions to the
hospital and the provision of expensive and unnecessary care.5,22
Limitations
This study focused on the viewpoints of high level managers; the
results may differ in more recent earthquakes due to improve-
ments and development in disaster management.28 As an
interview study, there is risk of selection bias due to the small
number of participants interviewed. This study was conducted
well after the earthquake event, and it is likely there was memory
decay and temporal loss of immediate event recall. This study
may lack external validity outside the Bam region of Iran.
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Conclusions
The present study showed that the managers experienced two
main problems. First, there was inadequate preparation of local
health organizations, which was due to unfamiliarity of the needs,
unavailability of essential needs, and increasing demands, all of
which were above the participants’ expectations. Second,
inappropriateness of donation and delivery service was perceived
as another problem.
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